One can learn much from the ruins of the past. Whether it demonstrates an arrogant mistake or incredible feat, the past is an account of related patterns that can justify how to handle the problems of today. The circumstances regarding the downfall of the Mycenaeans show that there are aspects closely tied to human survival which should not be taken for granted. The preceding events of The Plague of Athens demonstrate that disasters happen for a reason. Both these events parallel the horrific aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, and explain why it ended up the way that it did.
A major deciding factor in the possibility of survival is whether or not an attempt is made to preserve necessary sectors of society, which can easily be distinguished by how well they benefit day-to-day life. For the Mycenaeans, the refusal to rebuild their Palace of Nestor was a sign that civilization as they knew it had ended. The Palace of Nestor, like any other Peloponnesian palace during the time, served an important function as an economic hub and emergency facility; Linear B tablets from Pylos detail how Nestor tracked the distribution of major exports materials responsible for their society’s income such as textiles or metals, and provided an alternative safe storage for food in the instance of crop failure (Blackwell, 2020). Because it had become common in the Late Bronze Age for increased migration patterns and natural disasters, there was a pressing need to reinforce the Palace with safeguards to accommodate both the new people and the changing climate (Cosmopoulos, 2019). At some point, palaces across the Pelopponese would be destroyed by aggressors from abroad, possibly Sea People or Dorians (Knapp & Manning, 2016). While there is no concrete explanation for specifically why the Mycenaeans were attacked by these invaders, the point still remains that their living and survival relied on the continued functionality of The Palace of Nestor. The distribution of goods, circulation of income, and emergency food security depended on Nestor working in conjunction with agricultural yield, but a refusal to reinforce it, rebuild it, its subsequent abandonment and the struggle to achieve any success in the increasingly arid conditions led to the destabilization of Mycenaean society.
Similarly, Hurricane Katrina’s severity was exacerbated by its refusal to put funds into their levees or address its prevailing inequality problems, both substantial to the well-being of the citizens of New Orleans; even before the disaster happened, the city was heavily dependent on an unsustainable oil economy that ravaged its land’s integrity through constant drilling, leaving vulnerability in water mitigation systems (Lemann et al. 2020). Not once did the state government prepare for the worst, instead investing into superficial real estate fitted with stormwater drainage meant for minimal flooding at best and only affordable by the wealthy. New Orleans had also historically practiced segregation policies that intentionally left out state funds for communities with Black populations, explaining which neighborhoods were subject to the destructive drilling operations. The effects of the hurricane were felt by all, but especially worse for minorities, all because the government ignored a flood mitigation system that was all-encompassing or addressed its poverty issues disproportionately affecting Black neighborhoods.
Contrary to popular belief, disasters are not unanticipated. It can be easy to tell when and how a disaster will strike based on obvious signs and considering the logical progression of events, as was the case for The Plague of Athens during 430 BC. According to the writer, Thucydides, the Peloponnesian war with Sparta and its allies was amidst. The wartime general Pericles had ordered Athenian citizens to huddle inside the city walls. Preceding this, there had been persistent rumors of an overseas plague coming from Ethiopia, which did not seem to raise any alarms for the Athenians that their attackers were arriving via naval fleets (Hughes, 2012). Surely enough the disease arrived via port, and transmission was quickened by the close contact of the people barricaded inside.
Hurricane Katrina once again being a comparable event, the U.S. government had gone on record in anticipating a natural disaster of its magnitude but remained apathetic until the last minute. A year prior to Katrina’s actual arrival, emergency planners had prepared a computer simulation depicting a fictional but similar Category 3 hurricane hitting New Orleans (Thomas, 2005). The results interpreted that there would be 61,290 dead and 384,257 injured in the end, eerily similar to the numbers and circumstances of Hurricane Katrina (Fournier & Bridis, 2005). Even outside of human casualties the simulation detailed how the flood waters would pass over the levees, tying back to their aforementioned poor integrity.
Disasters do not always have to end in tragedy, so long as certain precautions are taken to prevent widespread damage. Survival hinges on the identification and preservation of the necessary sectors of society, particularly aspects important to the well-being of day-to-day life. For the Mycenaeans, it was The Palace that was important to their livelihoods and food security. For the people of New Orleans, it was equal treatment and a fair infrastructure system. There would also be telltale signs of impending catastrophe, events that follow which suggest the likelihood of a worst case scenario. This is evident by the correlations preceding The Plague of Athens; a rumored disease from overseas being brought ashore by naval invaders, limited movement of its people concentrating the disease inside the city walls, and the brutality of the Peloponnesian War forcing scared citizens inside despite the ever-present risk of contamination. Likewise, Hurricane Katrina forewarned the government with a computer simulation prior to the actual event, which urged them to do the right thing and fix up the flimsy levees tied to the disproportionate neighborhood poverty. As it would appear today, the government was too late.
References
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https://www.newyorker.com/books/under-review/why-hurricane-katrina-was-not-a-natural-disaster.
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